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<b>Remarks:</b>  Attached is the transcript of Mr. Colby's talk before the Associated Press Managing Editors on 15 October. Five copies were sent to Mr. Thuermer.  <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: fit-content; margin: 10px auto;">MORI/CDF Pages 2 thru 12</div>			
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The Speeches

ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS

15 October 1975

Moderator: Jack Jones, Jr.

Introduction of Mr. Colby by Jones

If you drive the interstate out across western Kansas, you eventually come to a small town. The water towers and the grain elevators and the buildings stand up above the flat prairie and are visible for miles. Visible and yet isolated. The town is Colby. Our first speaker today, CIA Director William Colby, perhaps finds himself in the position of being quite visible for miles around and somewhat isolated. He was born in Minnesota, an Army brat, he lived all over the world; he graduated from Princeton; from the Columbia Law School; was a New York lawyer before World War II intervened; and he went into the OSS and wound up parachuting behind enemy lines in various parts of Europe. When the Korean War broke out in 1950 he went back into intelligence and has basically been in it ever since. He was Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the CIA's operations in the mid-1960s, he was loaned to the State Department and ran the Vietnam pacification program. In 1971 he became Executive Editor--rather Director--of the CIA, and in 1973 the Director of the CIA -- Bill Colby.

Mr. Colby:

Thank you very much Mr. Jones. It is a pleasure to be here. That slip of the tongue was really one of the themes I want to get across here because I am, in a way, a managing editor too.

When I spoke at your fellow (and sometimes, I gather, adversary) group of publishers last spring, I referred to myself as a fellow publisher. Here I think I can refer to myself a bit as a fellow managing editor. Why? Well, for several reasons. Almost any day when I can (and they are becoming a little fewer than they used to be) around six o'clock I go down and have an editorial conference with the various people who put out our publications--the President's brief, the publication we put out for a broader group of Washingtonians, the publication that we send around the world to the different commands and embassies, and the publication that we prepare and design for other particular audiences. I also am a little bit of the managing editor in that I meet weekly with the members of the United States Intelligence Board--the heads of the other agencies--where we try to make editorial judgments about what's going on in the world, or what we call "estimates." I suppose you would call them longer-range editorial look-aheads or news analysis. And, of course, I also have something to do with the circulation business because I am responsible for briefing the National

Security Council when it meets, or one of its various subcommittees; or briefing the Congress on what is going on in various parts of the world, and so I really am sharing the kind of function and problem that you have. I also have the management function of looking over the entire Intelligence Community outside of CIA, as well as within CIA, to try to bring it together and make it produce the best results for the investment.

The basic lesson is that intelligence is different from the old myth of what intelligence used to be. I think most people's view of intelligence is founded on a combination of Matti Hari and James Bond and a little bit Maxwell Smart. But intelligence has changed over the years. Intelligence is still collection, but it is collection particularly of the material openly available--that the press makes available, that appears in books, that appears in conversations, on foreign broadcasts and so forth. It is collection through technical devices. And here, again, I understand you spent yesterday talking about the way the technological revolution is affecting your business. Well, it has had an enormous impact on the intelligence business over the years. It has changed the fundamentals of much of our effort because of its collection of additional material that previously we wouldn't have dreamed of getting through photographs, through electronics, through the use of the computer, and so forth.

And there is still collection through clandestine means because we have to do that against some of the closed societies that we face around the world--those which don't have a free press; which don't have investigating committees of congress; which don't give speeches to the public about what is going on, and which don't have opposition parties to bring out the varied views of that nation. It's also analysis, though, because analysis has become a fundamental aspect of intelligence, and this has been a contribution made particularly here in America after the lesson of Pearl Harbor, in which we found that we had bits and pieces of the jigsaw puzzle scattered around the government but that nobody had put it together and drawn a conclusion. Well, we now have that analysis function and we have the talents, experience and expertise of the large corps of analysts--everything from nuclear scientists to political observers to agriculture economists--who live out in Langley and study the best raw material in the world to try to derive professional judgments. It is also presentation. It's the matter of getting the word over to those who need it. To the Executive Branch--yes; to the Congress--yes, because of the many judgments which have to be made not only by the Executive but also by the Congress. We have to make the results of our information available to the Congress so they can make the same kind of informed judgments about the world

that the Executive can, and then contest a little bit about which one is right.

It is also the job of intelligence to make estimates about the future. We are not claiming to have a crystal ball in the CIA. Certainly you, of all people, know that intelligence can estimate only probabilities; can inform only about the forces and factors at work in the world. We cannot make absolute predictions about the unknowables, the interaction of different individuals, the spontaneous action of some local despot somewhere who decides overnight that he will do something. We have been fooled by this latter kind of effort, and we have been fooled also by those who have consciously put together a program to deceive us, or to deceive other nations and incidentally to deceive us.

Intelligence, then, has changed in many of these ways. It has changed in other ways also. It has changed from its old concentration on the military threat--the old image of the spy who steals the secret and gives it to the general who wins the battle. Today intelligence informs our national leadership and our public as well--because the national leadership informs our public--of the way things are moving overseas, so that everybody understands the factors that are involved.

We have a rather interesting change in the time frame concerning the things we formerly didn't know. We use to

wonder how many missiles the Soviets had. We don't wonder about that anymore--we count them. We know exactly how many they have. Now we are thinking about what they are going to have five years from now and ten years from now. That is the focus of our attention, and that is the focus of our analysts who project from what is there today. It is the focus of our collectors who are trying to get underneath the sheds and see what is in the research laboratory; to see what is in the other areas of political decision-making in terms of intention which can't be seen by the photographs or can't be untangled by the electronics. So this move ahead in time is what intelligence is providing for our national leadership. And it is making a contribution not only in the military field, but also in the economic field and in the political field. We have moved intelligence from simply the defense of our country to a positive role in decision-making and even peace-making around the world.

We sometimes are criticized for our wrong estimates. We have been wrong on some occasions that you haven't heard about. We have been wrong because we have predicted a certain course of action overseas, and this has generated action by our government to try to bring influence to bear on that situation and, as a result, the action hasn't happened. We were right in our estimate, but the result was that we gave our government the material with which it

could move to change a situation and avoid a crisis. I think this, then, is the new reality of intelligence. It is different from the old image, and we are now engaged in an effort to develop a new resolution of the very dilemmas that Mr. Jones was referring to in those quotations. We in America are adding one further dimension to intelligence. We are insisting that intelligence be responsible--that it be responsible to our Constitution and responsible to our laws, and we have the dilemma of how we can be responsible to this open society and still keep those secrets that George Washington and all the rest of the people since him have realized are essential to the conduct of intelligence. We are hammering out the resolution of that dilemma. In previous years it wasn't even looked at. Intelligence was put on the side, not looked at, not thought about. Nations conducted it but never mentioned it. Today, we Americans insist--after Vietnam and after Watergate--that our government explain what it is doing, that it expose its standards and values to our laws and to our own ethical senses. We Americans are looking at just where the proper line is between the free workings of intelligence of the past and too much of an exposure of intelligence which will eliminate its contribution to our nation in the future.

This is the subject of these investigations, and I think that we are in that process. It is to you, particularly,



that I would appeal to get us all to do this investigation of intelligence in a responsible manner, because we must be responsible in the largest sense about our intelligence. Intelligence itself must be responsible to our laws, but we Americans who are concerned about our country also must be responsible with respect to what we do to our intelligence. We don't want to conduct an investigation five or ten years from now as to why we destroyed our intelligence. We don't want to drive ourselves into the dilemma of Secretary of State Stimson when he said that gentlemen don't read each other's mail, and then fifteen years later found himself, as Secretary of War, reading as much German and Japanese mail as he could get his hands on! We must come to some reasonable balance about our country's need for intelligence in the world of the future, not necessarily the world of Pearl Harbor or of the past, but the world which is characterized by a nuclear missile cocked and aimed at us here--and only 30 minutes away; a world which is increasingly being subject to the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of potentially reckless despots or paranoid terrorists; a world which is becoming increasingly interdependent in an economic sense, in the cultural sense, and in the political sense; a world where you can see the pressures building--the gap between the population and the available food; the gap between the affluent, comfortable, developed countries

and the underdeveloped countries with that gap growing and the envy factor growing. And there is the concept of third worldism which comes close to the edge of being racist in its basic approach because it criticizes the advanced countries--the European countries, even the Soviet Union, and the United States--all as a package in favor of the third world, the underdeveloped part, that has suffered so much in these past centuries. Now this world is the world we Americans are facing in the '80s and '90s. It is one in which we must be responsible about anticipating and thinking. Will we know enough about that world to make informed decisions? Will we know enough about the threats that are coming? Will we know enough to conduct positive peace-making to limit the arms races through the contribution that our intelligence can make?

It is intelligence that has made the difference to the arrival of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Prior to that time we had no way of monitoring whether the other side would actually abide by agreements or not. Now we do have a way of monitoring that, and therefore we can make the kind of agreement that we made in the SALT area. We have other agreements that we must make with other nations around the world, and we must be in a position of being able to monitor and verify that the other side is actually following those.

Therefore, I think in this responsible approach we must take a broad look at what we want intelligence to be--in the

sense of being responsible to our government and to our people--because we are hammering out a totally new concept. There isn't another intelligence chief around the world who has to speak to the Associated Press Managing Editors. In fact, in most countries, as one foreigner said to me once in one meeting of this kind, he would be arrested if he asked the name of his chief of intelligence. This is a new experiment. There are those who say it is impossible. I don't. I think it is possible for responsible Americans to work out a way to achieve a responsible intelligence. But I make a particular plea to you all. We have had a lot of trouble with the sensational presentation of our problems. It is, perhaps, natural. I understand the motivation behind it. After Vietnam, after Watergate, the most secret part of the government has been the intelligence business. With the credibility problems that our people have had about government, it is quite natural that they would expect to find wrongdoing, coverup, and all the rest of those things in the intelligence business. Therefore, there is great attention and excitement when the veil of secrecy is lifted--even a little bit. Now this, I think, is understandable, but I do ask for some proportion in the way you ladies and gentlemen particularly go at your jobs. I think it is important that we not make CIA the headline scapegoat for all the revision of our values and consensus of the past 25 years. I think it

important that we look at the facts of these investigations. When we do, we find that the investigations basically are bringing to light the things that the Intelligence Community looked at itself, found, and corrected. Intelligence is finding things that were wrong, that were done--as the Rockefeller Commission said--because a President directed it, because there was a gray area in the law and it was believed to be right, or, in some cases, because of an excess of enthusiasm and zeal which led into unlawful actions which should not be repeated. The Commission also pointed out that these wrongs have been relatively few in the 28 years' history of CIA. I believe if you look at any community the size of CIA you will find a similar record of some failures and some faults over 25 years. I don't think they have been more than that. I think we have corrected them ourselves. I think we are cooperating in this review of what we Americans want intelligence to do, and I merely ask that we Americans be responsible--as we insist that intelligence be responsible--in these days ahead.

Thank you very much.